Foreword: Toward a Multicultural Theory of Property Rights by Wright, Danaya C.
University of Florida Levin College of Law
UF Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2000
Foreword: Toward a Multicultural Theory of
Property Rights
Danaya C. Wright
University of Florida Levin College of Law, wrightdc@law.ufl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Law and Society Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact outler@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Danaya C. Wright, Foreword: Toward a Multicultural Theory of Property Rights, 12 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 2 (2000), available at
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/218
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA P& PUBLIC POLICY
FOREWORD: TOWARD A MULTICULTURAL THEORY
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
Danaya C. Wright'
This panel, sponsored by the Minority group and Property Sections of
the AALS for the January, 2000 annual meeting, was composed of an
exciting group of scholars critically analyzing traditional theories of
property and current distribution of resources.2 The panel, entitled
"Reviewing the Legacy of Liberalism: Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness - Linking Property to Rights," challenged traditional notions
of property rights, from a discussion of the gender implications of African
property law, to a critique of traditional analyses of Johnson v. M'Intosh,3
to property as heteronormative. Because the articles provide so much rich
and thought-provoking material, I would like to focus my comments on
ways in which ongoing historical disputes about property rights will be
manifested in the coming years as highlighted in the papers that follow.
A fundamental tenet of neoclassical liberalism posits that equality of
rights is necessary to human flourishing. And a principal right is that of
property, a right that even in a Marxist regime is protected at some level
on the grounds that labor should be encouraged and that basic needs
satisfied. Some notion of property is necessary for human existence. But
in our current legal regime, the overriding legacy of liberalism is a
privileging of the right to exclude over the variety of other rights in the
bundle of property rights.4 Unlike the rights to use, alienate, or devise, the
I. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I would like to
thank Berta Esperanza Hernindez-Truyol for giving me the opportunity to participate in this
exciting symposium. I would also like to thank Florence Roisman for her dedicated chairmanship
of the property section this past year. And I would of course like to thank the panel members:
Leslye Obiora, Guadalupe Luna, Jo Carrillo, Frank Valdez, and Sumi Cho. And I especially want
to thank Nissa Laughner and Katie McKinley for their comments and suggestions, as well as their
cite checking and editing of this Foreword and the following articles. Any mistakes remain entirely
mine.
2. Papers were presented by Jo Carrillo, Professor of Law at University of California at
Hastings; Sumi Cho, Associate Professor of Law at DePaul University School of Law; Guadalupe
Luna, Associate Professor of Law at Northern Illinois School of Law; Leslye Amede Obiora,
Associate Professor of Law at the University of Arizona College of Law; and Francisco Valdez,
Professor of Law at University of Miami College of Law.
3. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
4. The most common expression of this version of property comes from Blackstone, who
wrote that:
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the
affections of mankind, as the right of property; or'that sole and despotic dominion
[Vol, 12
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right to exclude is the right upon which market value most directly
depends and, in a capitalist market, enjoys the status of the legally
protected right that makes the world turn. The life of liberalism began in
capitalist market societies and it can only be fully comprehended in terms
of the social and economic institutions that shaped it.5 Thus, although
liberalism relies on certain concepts of rights, equality, and justice,
property plays a central role in human individuality and freedom, and is
therefore a principal component of liberal society.
But liberal society has its problematic elements. As Rousseau argued,
the right to exclude is an invention of the rich to secure their greater
possessions against the threats of the poor by convincing the latter that
they too benefit from the right to exclude, that in protecting the property
of the rich they protect their own measly shares.6 But as Rousseau saw the
bargain, the institutionalization of property was a race to meet their chains,
for:
[s]uch was, or must have been, the origin of society and laws,
which gave new fetters to the weak and new forces to the
rich, destroyed natural freedom for all time, established
forever the law of property and inequality, changed a clever
usurpation into an irrevocable right, and for the profit of a
few ambitious men henceforth subjected the whole human
race to work, servitude, and misery.'
The right to exclude, for Rousseau, is at the heart of the inequality created
by a property-based regime, an inequality that liberalism at one level seeks
to overcome.' Yet the realization that property creates inequality, but
protecting property is the first goal of civil society, means that liberalism
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (facsimile ed. 1979)
(1765-1769); see alsoCarol M. Rose, Canons ofProperty Talk or, Blackstone 'sAnxiety, 108 YALE
L. J. 601 (1998).
5. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (NY: Cambridge UP, 1960); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (London: Oxford UP, 1971); MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND
THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (NY: Cambridge UP, 1982); Immanuel Kant, Critique ofPractical Reason,
in IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL AND POLITICAL WRITINGS (NY: Random House, 1949); John Stuart
Mill, On Liberty, in THE UTILITARIANS (Garden City: Doubleday, 1961).
6. JEANJACQUESROUSSEAU, THESECONDDISCOURSE, 2nd Part, at 159-60 (Roger Masters,
ed., NY: St. Martin's Press, 1964).
7. Id. at 160.
8. One of the principal goals of liberalism is some relatively robust version of equality. See
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1977); RAWLS, supra
note 5.
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contains an inherent tension in its protection of property rights on the one
hand with its tommitment to justice and equality on the other. This tension
can be seen in a multitude of areas, but I mention just three that I believe
will pose interesting dilemmas in the coming years.
One area of fundamental tension, evident to those of us who work in
areas of environmental law and takings, involves the rhetoric and
mythology of absolute dominion continually contrasted to necessary
restrictions on property rights in disputes over limitations on use, public
rights, and communitarian notions of stewardship.9 Blackstone best
articulated the Roman law precept of strict property rights when he wrote
of "property as absolute dominion, 'that sole and despotic dominion which
one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe."" Robert
Gordon, however, has explained that the "unruly pluralism" of
basic eighteenth-century social and economic institutions
were not absolute dominion rights but, instead, property
rights fragmented and split among many holders;... property
relations of dependence and subordination; property subject
to arbitrary and discretionary direction or destruction at the
will of others; property surrounded by restriction on use and
alienation; property qualified and regulated for communal or
state purposes; [and] property destabilized by fluctuating and
conflicting regimes of legal regulation."
The latter part of this century has witnessed a profound rise in the popular
appeal of the myth of absolute dominion through increased takings
litigation, introduction of compensation legislation in every state
legislature and Congress, and a fundamental redefinition of regulatory
takings doctrine. 2 I suggest that this tension will continue to grow because
of the fragmentation of property rights, the destabilization of takings
9. David Seipp, The Concept of Property in the Early Common Law, 12 LAW & HIST. REv.
29 (1994); David Schultz, Political Theory and Legal History: Conflicting Depictions ofProperty
in the American Political Founding, 37 Am. J. LET. HIST. 465 (1993); Carol Rose, supra note 4, at
601; Glen Sugamelli, Takings Bills Threaten Private Property. People, and the Environment, 8
FORD. ENVTL. L. J. 521 (1997); J. Peter Byrne, Ten Argumentsfor the Abolition of the Regulatory
Takings Doctrine, 22 Ecology L. Q. 89 (1995).
10. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 2.
11. Robert Gordon, Paradoxical Property, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY
96 (Brewer & Staves eds. 1996) [hereinafter EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS].
12. William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of Takings, and
Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & M. L. REV. 1151 (1997); Byrne, supra note 9, at 89; Jerold S.
Kayden, Hunting for Quarks: Constitutional Takings, Property Rights, and Government
Regulation, 50 WASH. U. J. URBAN& CoNTEMP. L. 125 (1996).
[Val. 12
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doctrine, and the rhetorical appeal of absolute dominion. 3 One of the
implications of that fragmentation and destabilization, however, is the
ever-widening gap between a mythology of property as absolute dominion
and an equally troubling mythology of property as communal and non-
exclusive. 1
4
Jo Carrillo's paper is a nuanced examination of the contrast between
a private property regime based on the right to exclude and a mythological
story about indigenous understandings of land use. The myth is typically
placed in contradistinction to a European notion of absolute property rights
in such a way as to occlude the complicity of the private property regime
in creating the myth to justify its own existence. As Carrillo explains: "the
fact that indigenous rights and interests are discussed in the first year
curriculum only in the first year property course functionally transforms
the indian into a signifier whose political function throughout the rest of
law school is essentially to make student-initiates of the legal profession
skeptical about indigenous property interests on both a broad, ideological
level as well as on an unconscious, symbolic level."' 5
Carillo begins by exploring the way in which mythologies and legal
narratives are similarly constructed. By drawing from a mythology of the
indian as "conquered, defeated, excluded outsider[],"' 6 judges created a
legal narrative that in turn influenced and determined the law. The myth,
in essence, has become the law in a way that "has robbed indigenous
communities of their right to control, or even to participate in the credited
production of the U.S.' governing mythologies."' 7 Bringing to light the
inner-workings of the mythology of conquest, hopes Carrillo, will reveal
the irrationality of the symbol of the indian as a foil used to teach liberal
ideologies, and will, at the same time, reflect back on the law as a symbol
itself.'" This may be a fancy way of saying that the mythology of primitive
indigenous peoples has become an unassailable "truth" in our legal system
by occupying a position of ideological dogma that cannot be challenged.
13. See Gordon, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS, supra note 11, at 96. "[Tlhe price that has
been paid for the compulsive power of the absolute dominion trope has been a heavy one, a
maddeningly persistent tendency to suppress and to deny the collective and collaborative elements,
the necessity of mutual dependence, inherent in social endeavor, and a consequently enormous
distortion in our common capacities to understand and regulate our social life." Id. at 108.
14. Jo Carrillo, Disabling Certitudes: An Introduction to the Role of Mythologies ofConquest
in Law; in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS, supra at 11, at 13; Siepp, supra note 9; Treanor, supra
note 12, at 1151; John Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance for Modern Takings
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1252 (1996).
15. Carrillo, supra note 14, at 29.
16. Id at l4.
17. Id. at 16.
18. Id. at 19.
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To support her claim, Carrillo looks primarily to Justice Marshall's
promulgation and legalization of the mythology of conquest in Johnson v.
M'Intosh. For Carrillo, Marshall's failure to recognize the first in time
indian grants stemmed from his belief that indian possession of land was
not a right of property or dominion that an indigenous person could
legitimately expect to have backed up by U.S. law. Perhaps the most
powerful point of Carrillo's argument is her description of how a narrative
of European violence and genocide is rewritten as an apologetic of
civilization, ascendancy, and "hard Yankee bargains,"' 9 and then
repackaged for first-year law students as a story about how generous
Marshall was in finding some sort of indigenous property rights he could
protect from within a framework of European property law that could only
conceive of property as absolute dominion and exclusivity.
Carrillo's critique is a powerful indictment of the way indigenous
people have been caricatured and stereotyped by the majority colonial
culture for centuries as uncivilized, savage, barbarous, primitive,
mystically motivated, irrational, unassimilable and ultimately unsuited to
possessing legal property rights. For Carrillo, however, the failure of any
late twentieth-century casebook writer to at least question the Indian
narrative which uses the indigenous peoples as signifiers rather than
subjects in their own right perpetuates the de-historicizing of the narrative
and operates as a "disabling certitude."20 And it is this absence of the
indigenous narrative within law that destabilizes the dominant narratives
and results in an incomplete legal education and a profoundly unjust legal
system.
To the extent that property rights continue to be ranked in ascending
order, with the right to exclude at the top, law students will continue to be
skeptical of multiple perspectives and values in the post-modem
commitment to equality. Moreover, to the extent we continue to
uncritically offer a strict private property regime that privileges absolute
dominion as the norm and essential characteristic of property, students will
view multiculturalism as the artificial construct, rather than
multiculturalism calling into question the artificial constructs of an
essentialized notion of absolute dominion that is bolstered by the
mythology of indigenous property beliefs.
Another debate that will continue to fester in property scholarship is
the question of welfare rights, or the rights of the have-nots to some
portion of the wealth of the haves. Ironically, the grandfather of
Liberalism's property rights theory, John Locke, included two provisos in
his famous labor theory of property. The first was the proviso not to waste,
19. Id. at 23.
20. Id. at 29.
[Vol. 12
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and the second was that everyone has an "equal right" or "a right in
common... [to] provide for their subsistence."' As Richard Ashcraft
explains:
this right to subsistence is defended by Locke as a necessary
means to fulfill the general obligation laid upon each
individual by the Law of Nature to act so'as to preserve all
mankind. Thus, an individual has 'a right to the surplusage'
of another's goods because natural law gives every man a
title to so much out of another's plenty, as will keep him from
extreme want, where he has not means to subsist otherwise.
22
But David Hume and Edmund Burke ultimately won the debate about
the rights of the laboring poor to legally protected subsistence rights in a
post-subsistence form of society. As Ashcraft explains:
Burke declared, 'we have heard many plans for the relief of
the "laboring poor,"' but such plans are foolish, if not
pernicious, since 'to provide for us in our necessities is not in
the power of government.' Hence, 'meddling with the
subsistence of the people' .. . is a misdirection of energy; the
poor must be left to provide for themselves, and, whatever the
material outcome of their efforts, they must learn to accept
their condition with patience and submission.
23
I believe we will see a continued tension between the Burkean ideology of
the laboring poor pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, a position
entrenched in the liberal property right to exclude, and the Lockean
stricture that all people have a natural right to satisfaction of basic human
needs. Insofar as property is necessary to basic human needs, a liberal
theory that ignores the racial and gendered ways in which certain groups
are excluded from legal protections of property rights cannot provide
significant applicability to a post-colonial, multicultural world.
In exploring the links between liberty and property, Guadalupe Luna
analyzes the story told by silence in the law regarding conflicts arising out
of the U.S. government's promise to the nation's earliest Chicana/os that
they could remain on their land in the territory annexed through the Treaty
21. JOHN LOCKE, supra note 5, FIRST TREATISE, pars. 86-93, at 97; SECOND TREATSE, par.
25.
22. Richard Ashcraft, Lockean Ideas, Poverty, and the Development of Liberal Political
Theory, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS, supra note 11, at 45.
23. Id. at 55.
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of Guadalupe Hidalgo.24 Prior to the war with Mexico, men and women of
Mexican and Spanish descent had settled in what is now the Southwestern
part of the United States under the authority of the Spanish, and then the
Mexican government. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo guaranteed that
they would retain ownership of their land with all the legal rights and
privileges necessary to protect their rights under American law. Within a
short period of time, however, almost all of Chicana/o property had vested
in non-Chicana/o hands through such mundane actions as refusing to
recognize title in the possessor if there were no recorded title documents,
failing to consider the role of land grant legislation, and neglecting to
honor the terms of the Treaty. The effect was to return the grantees to their
original status as Mexican foreigners and dispossess them of their land and
their legal rights.
Luna goes on to show how the erosion of Chicana/o property rights
resulted in erosion of liberty and obscuring of the race, class, and gender
implications of the post-Treaty dismantling of Chicana/o legal rights. After
describing a number of land grant cases and the role played by Justice
Roger Taney in their resolution, Luna calls for a fuller analysis of land
grant adjudication, the revisionist legal history of the period, and the
meaning of the linkages between property and liberty interests necessary
for meaningful citizenship.25 She points particularly at the racism that
motivated much of the legal maneuverings that resulted in the loss of a
majority of Chicana/o land both to individual land grabbers and the
governments. Much of the public land of the Southwest subsequently
distributed to homesteaders, the railroads, or retained as public lands was
acquired through governmental complicity and participation in
dispossessing the original grantees of their land. Thus, while the Treaty
promised these landowners equal status and legal protections, subsequent
state and federal property jurisprudence re-racialized them, stripped them
of their property and political liberty, and returned them to their original
outsider status.26
In critiquing the post-war treatment of Chicana/o property rights, and
the dominant explanation of that history, Luna cogently reveals the
complicity of the government and property law in the disempowerment
and dispossession of outsiders, by race, class, or gender. Thus, the
Lockean proviso that the poor have a right to subsistence levels of
property seems disturbingly insufficient in light of institutional structures
and behavior that create and guarantee an underclass of non-propertied,
politically disenfranchised, and racialized poor. Recognizing that rights to
24. See Guadalupe Luna, Chicana/os, "Liberty" andRoger B. Taney, 12 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 33 (2000).
25. Id. at 36-37.
26. Id. at 50-51.
[Vol. 12
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resources are fundamental to human flourishing, and therefore undergird
any justifiable theory of property, requires that we examine carefully the
role of any property regime in the creation and maintenance of a class of
non-propertied individuals.
A third area where I foresee tensions between liberal notions of
property and the changing values of a post-modem world are in
personhood and identity rights exemplified in group rights, tribal- rights,
or cultural rights to such things as cultural symbols, historical artifacts,
and native practices." For this idea we turn to Rousseau who declared that
"the first person who, having fenced off a plot of ground, took it into his
head to say this is mine and found people simple enough to believe him,
was the founder of civil society."28 For Rousseau, Lockean labor is a form
of subjugation: "the fence is the permanent sign both of individual
appropriation and of the neighbor's recognition of that gesture. For
Rousseau, it marks a deep form of alienation."29 Rousseau's response to
the first fencer comes from the poor person who replies,
who gave you its dimension... and by virtue of what do you
presume to be paid at our expense for work we did not
impose on you? Do you not know that a multitude of your
brethren die or suffer from need of what you have in excess,
and that you needed express and unanimous consent of the
human race to appropriate for yourself anything from
common subsistence that exceeded your own.30
For Rousseau, therefore, the first fencer is disturbing the equilibrium of
"an already integrated network of social relations."'" He also exists in an
uneasy contradiction between the alienating forces of property and the
liberal tenet that "property is the true basis of civil society."32
The tension of Rousseau's first fencer is clearly evident in the
contemporary debates about identity, personhood, and property and in the
diversity of cases concerning group rights and cultural property.33 To the
27. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW (1990); Rosemary Coombe, The Properties of Culture and the Politics of
Possessing Identity: Native Claims in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy, 6 CAN. J. L. &
JURIS. 249 (1993); Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural
Property in the United States, 73 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1995); Margaret Jane Radin, Market
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849 (1987).
28. ROUSSEAU, supra note 6, at 141.
29. Patrick Coleman, Property, Politics, and Personality in Rousseau, in EARLY MODERN
CONCEPTIONS, supra note 11, at 258.
30. ROUSSEAU, supra note 6, at 158.
31. Coleman, supra note 29, at 259.
32. Id. at 262.
33. See articles on cultural property, supra note 27.
2000]
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extent to which property disturbs social relations, we see in the
appropriation of minority signs or resources by the majority culture an
inherent conflict between liberalism's commitment to the right to exclude
and property's dependence on social relationships. Leslye Obiora
illustrates this point well in her paper on the gendered effects of land
redistribution in Africa.34
Obiora first discusses the effects of colonialism on traditional beliefs
about property and the importance of land to family and community
stability. Prior to colonization, land was held not so much communally,
but through a structure of lesser usufruct rights wherein each citizen had
a right of access to the resources of the territory, and an individual had an
inheritable right to the land he or she cultivated. 3' But because there were
few people to whom one could alienate one's land, and because political
relationships were not premised on landholding, as they were in feudal
Europe, large landholders exploited large areas of land because they
controlled a large number of people, not the other way around.36 As she
explains, however, "[a]s African 'communities became increasingly
incorporated in a Western-oriented trade economy, property became more
commercialized' and 'the basis of holding land [shifted] from one of
community and custom to one of individualism and contract.""'
Ironically, the result of this shift was to elevate notions of communal
landholding that made it difficult to alienate land because it was deemed
to be held in trust for future members of the community. But in effect, the
community was represented by the head of the family, which
paradoxically "affirmed an orthodox notion of collective ownership at the
same time that it accentuated the conditions for individual ownership and
furnished the paraphernalia for its security. 38 This, in turn, created a
regime that eroded traditional claims by women to land, as patriarchal
values were superimposed on the strict communal form of landholding.
In the post-colonial period, social transformations have provided an
impetus to convert to a market economy in land which accelerates
individualization and privatization of landholding.39 But women inevitably
lost out in this transformation. Land redistribution in Zimbabwe, for
instance, has been motivated by a prioritization of the struggle against
racism over the struggle against patriarchy, which leaves women
disempowered as their male counterparts acquire political and economic
34. Leslye Amede Obiora, Remapping the Domain of Property in Africa, 12 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 57 (2000).
35. Id. at 60.
36. Id. at61.
37. Id. at 61-62.
38. Id. at 65.
39. Id. at 62.
(Vol. 12
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wealth. The essence of Obiora's argument is that, without tending to the
gender disparities created during the colonial period, current land
redistribution based in some part on the status quo simply reimposes
gender differences as Africa is forced toward a system of private
landowning.
Obiora's paper brilliantly shows how a system of private property that
fails to take into account a robust notion of community and family norms
and does not adequately recognize the struggle of minority groups to equal
resources will result in a skewed and ultimately discriminatory and
dysfunctional property regime. Obiora's paper, along with the others,
reflects on the consequences of redressing current claims to property by
outsiders through a system of property whose very foundations depend on
the continuation of insider/outsider distinctions.
In the Afterword, Berta Hemindez-Truyol and Shelbi Day explore
Liberalism's linkage of status and property through the lens of the
exclusion of sexual minorities from fundamental property rights.' In
analyzing the denial of property rights to same-sex couples and the
elevation of marital status to a property right, Hemindez and Day argue
that sexual minorities are treated today like racial and ethnic minorities
were treated a century ago.4' Calling it the "straightness as property
paradigm," Hemndez and Day critique liberalism's privileging of marital
status, the Supreme Court's reliance on moral and religious values in
deciding disputes involving property rights of sexual minorities, and
Congressional and state legislature efforts to preclude recognition of same-
sex couples. Hemdnndez and Day argue that the Courts have both a moral
and Constitutional obligation to ensure that regulations affecting sexual
minorities do not violate Constitutional liberty and property rights of
individuals.42 This Afterword provides a fitting return to the theme of the
Symposium by reminding us that cultural context is a necessary backdrop
for understanding property rights. For while the context may change with
new groups seeking protection of their rights, the struggles are
disturbingly the same.
Ultimately, I would suggest that the legacy of liberalism is a complex
imbrication of competing social, legal, and political forces in an inherently
contradictory scheme of property rights. Locke, Burke, and Rousseau are
theorists whose very differences ironically compose certain of the
fundamental tenets of liberalism. And it is from those contradictions and
differences that contemporary scholars can unpack liberalism's reliance
on the right to exclude as the primary stick in the bundle in order to
40. Berta Hernindez-Truyol & Shelbi Day, Afterword- Straightness as Property: Back to
the Future - Law and Status in the 21st Century, 12 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71 (2000).
41. Id. at 90.
42. Id. at 88.
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recover the unruly pluralism of fragmented and collective property rights.
By viewing the historical legacy of liberalism we can see the roots of
inequality inherent in a regime of private property that frustrates
liberalism's true goal of equality and justice. For justice cannot exist if it
does not exist for everyone.
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